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Abstract. We argue for a compositional semantics grounded in a 
strongly typed ontology that reflects our commonsense view of the 
world and the way we talk about it. Assuming such a structure we 
show that the semantics of various natural language phenomena may 
become nearly trivial. 
 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
We argue that challenges in the semantics of natural language are rampant 
due to the gross mismatch between the trivial ontological commitments of our 
semantic formalisms and the reality of the world these formalisms purport to 
represent. In particular, we argue that semantics must be grounded in a much 
richer ontological structure, one that reflects our commonsense view of the 
world and the way we talk about it in ordinary language.  
Recently, it was suggested in Saba (2007) how language itself could be 
used as a tool to discover (rather than invent) the nature of this ontological 
structure. The purpose of the current paper is to demonstrate that semantics 
could become ‘nearly’ trivial when grounded in such an ontological structure 
and this done by assuming the existence of a fairly simple and uncontroversial 
ontological structure. Furthermore, it will also be demonstrated here that it is 
the process of the semantic analysis itself that will in turn help us shed some 
light on the nature of this ontological structure, a structure that must be 
isomorphic to our commonsense view of the world and the way we talk about 
it in ordinary language. 
 
 
2 Semantics with Ontological Content 
 
We begin by making a case for a semantics that is grounded in a strongly 
typed ontological structure that is isomorphic to our commonsense view of 
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reality. In doing so, our ontological commitments will initially be minimal. In 
particular, we assume the existence of a subsumption hierarchy of a number of 
general categories such as animal, substance, entity, artifact, etc.  
We shall use x( :: )animal  to state that x is an object of type animal, and 
Articulate x( :: )human  to state that the property Articulate is true of some 
object x, an object that must be of type human (since ‘articulate’ is a property 
that is ordinarily said of humans). We write x P x( :: )( ( ))∃ t  when the property 
P is true of some object x of type t; 1x P x( :: )( ( ))∃ t  when P is true of a unique 
object of type t; and ax P x( :: )( ( ))∃ t  when the property P is true of some 
object x of type t, an object that only conceptually (abstractly) exists - i.e., an 
object that need not physically exist. Proper nouns, such as Sheba, are 
interpreted as 
 
(1) 1sheba P x Noo x sheba P x[( )( ( :: ,‘ ’) ( :: ))]λ ∃ ∧  entity t⇒ , 
 
where Noo x s( :: , )entity  is true of some individual object x (of type entity), 
and s if (the label) s is the name of x. To simplify notation, we sometimes 
write (1) as 1λ= ∃ entity t sheba P sheba P x[( :: )( ( :: ))] . Let us define Is x y( , )  
to be a predicate that is true of some x and y when x is identical to y. 
Consider now the following: 
 
(2) William H. Bonney is Billy the Kid   
 x y Noo x whb Noo y btk Is x y1 1( :: )( :: )( ( , ‘ ’) ( ,‘ ’) ( , ))∃ ∃ ∧ ∧entity entity⇒  
 whb btk Is whb btk1 1( :: )( :: )( ( , ))∃ ∃entity entity⇒  
 
 William H. Bonney is William H. Bonney   
 x y Noo x whb Noo x whb Is x y1 1( :: )( :: )( ( ,‘ ’) ( , ‘ ’) ( , ))∃ ∃ ∧ ∧entity entity⇒  
 whb whb Is whb whb1 1( :: )( :: )( ( , ))∃ ∃entity entity⇒  
 whb True x Noo x whb1 1( :: )( ()) ( :: )( ( , ‘ ’))∃ ≡ ∃entity entity⇒  
 
This does seem plausible since ‘William H. Bonney is Billy the Kid’ should 
have more content than ‘William H. Bonney is William H. Bonney’ since the 
latter seems to only reiterate the existence of some ‘whb’1. 
Regarding associating types with variables it should be noted now that a 
variable might, in a single scope, be associated with more than one type. For 
example, x in (1) is considered to be an entity and an object of type t, where 
t is presumably the type of objects that the property P applies to (or makes 
sense of). In these situations some sort of type unification must occur, where 
                                                 
1
 Note that ∃ ∃ ∧s tx y P x Is x y( :: )( :: )( ( ) ( , )) ≡ ∃ •s tx P x( :: ( ))( ( )) ≡ ∃ •s ty P y( :: ( ))( ( ))
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the simplest case of type unification ( )•s t , between two types s and t, is 
defined as follows: 
 
 
(3)   
 
 
To illustrate the notion of type unification, consider the steps involved in the 
interpretation of sheba is hungry, where we have assumed ( )animal entity , 
and that Hungry is a property that applies to (or makes sense of) objects that 
are of type animal.  
 
sheba is hungry   
1sheba Hungry sheba( :: )( ( :: ))∃ entity animal⇒  
1sheba Hungry sheba( :: ( ))( ( ))∃ •animal entity⇒  
1sheba Hungry sheba( :: )( ( ))∃ animal⇒  
 
Thus, sheba is hungry states that there is a unique object named sheba, which 
must be an object of type animal, and such that sheba is Hungry. Type 
unification will not always be as straightforward, and this will be discussed in 
some detail below. For now, however, we are interested in highlighting the 
utility of ‘embedding’ ontological sorts into the properties and relations of our 
logical forms. Consider for example the steps involved in the interpretation of 
sheba is a young artist, given in (4). 
 
(4) sheba is a young artist   
 1sheba Artist sheba Young sheba( :: )( ( :: ) ( :: ))∃ ∧entity human physical⇒  
 1sheba Artist sheba Young sheba( :: ( ))( ( :: ) ( ))∃ • ∧⇒ entity physical human  
 1sheba Artist sheba Young sheba( :: )( ( :: ) ( ))∃ ∧⇒ physical human  
 1sheba Artist sheba Young sheba( :: ( ))( ( ) ( ))∃ • ∧⇒ human physical  
 1sheba Artist sheba Young sheba( :: )( ( ) ( ))∃ ∧human⇒  
 
In the final analysis, therefore, ‘sheba is a young artist’ is interpreted as 
follows: there is a unique object named sheba, an object of type human, and 
such that sheba is Artist and Young2. Note here that in contrast with human, 
which is a first-intension ontological concept (Cocchiarella, 2001), Artist and 
                                                 
2 The type unifications in (4) can occur in any order since (r • (s • t)) = ((r • s) • t). That is, 
type unification is associative (and of course commutative), and this is a consequence of the fact 
that (r  (s  t)) = ((r  s)  t), where   is the least upper bound (lub) operator. What is 
important, however, is that the type associated with the variable introduced by every quantifier 
be unified with the type of every property and relation, as demonstrated by later examples. 
if  
if  
otherwise
, ( )
( ) , ( )
,


• = 
⊥
s s t
s t t t s


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Young are considered to be second-intension logical concepts, namely 
properties that may or may not be true of first-intension (ontological) 
concepts3. Moreover, and unlike first-intension ontological concepts (such as 
human), logical concepts such as Artist and Young are assumed to be defined 
by virtue of logical expressions,  
 
dfx Artist x 1( :: )( ( ) )ϕ∀ ≡human  and 
dfx Young x 2( :: )( ( ) )ϕ∀ ≡animal , 
 
where the exact nature of 1ϕ  and 2ϕ  might very well be susceptible to 
temporal, cultural, and other contextual factors, depending on what, at a 
certain point in time, a certain community considers an Artist (for example) 
to be. That is, while the properties of being an Artist and Young that x 
exhibits are accidental (as well as temporal, cultural-dependent, etc.), the fact 
that some x is human (and thus an animal, etc.) is not4. 
 
 
3 More on Type Unification 
 
Thus far we have performed simple type unifications involving types that are 
in a subsumption relationship. For example, we have suggested above that 
( )•human entity  = human, since ( )human entity , i.e., since a human is also 
an entity. Quite often, however, it is not subsumption but some other 
relationship that exists between the different types associated with a variable, 
and a typical example is the case of nominal compounds. In particular, we are 
interested in answering the question of what types of objects do the following 
nominal compounds, for example, refer to: 
                                                 
3
 Not recognizing the ontological difference between human and Professor (namely, that what 
ontologically exist are objects of type human, and not professors, and that Professor is a mere 
property that may or may not apply to objects of type human) has traditionally led to ontologies 
rampant with multiple inheritance.  
 
4
 In a recent argument Against Fantology, Smith (2005) notes that too much attention has been 
paid to the false doctrine that much can be discovered about the ontological structure of reality 
by predication in first-order logic. According to Smith, for example, the use of standard 
predication in first-order logic in representing the meanings of ‘John is a human’ and ‘John is 
tall’ completely ignores the different ontological categories implicit in each utterance. While we 
agree with this observation, we believe that our approach to a semantics grounded in an a rich 
ontological structure that is supposed to reflect our commonsense reality, does solve this 
problem without introducing ad-hoc relations to the formalism, as example (4) and subsequent 
examples in this paper demonstrate. First-order logic (and Frege, for that matter), are therefore 
not necessarily the villains, and the ‘‘predicates do not represent’’ slogan is perhaps appropriate, 
but it seems only when predicates are devoid of any ontological content. 
W. S. SABA 
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(5) a. book review   
 b. book proposal   
 c. design review   
 d. design plan  
 
From the standpoint of commonsense, the existence of a book review should 
imply the existence of a book, while the existence of a book proposal should 
not (although it might after all exist, if, for example, we were speaking of a 
book proposal years after the publication of the book). Similar arguments can 
be made about the nominal compounds in (6c) and (6d)5. We could say 
therefore that a reference to a book review is a reference to a review (which is, 
ultimately, an activity), and the object of this activity must be an existing 
book; while a reference to a book proposal is a reference to a proposal of some 
book, a book that might not (yet) actually exist. That is,  
 
(6) a book review   
 P x y ReviewOf y x P y[( :: )( :: )( ( , ) ( ))]λ ∃ ∃ ∧⇒ book review  
(7) a book proposal 
 aP x y ProposalFor y x P y[( :: )( :: )( ( , ) ( ))]λ ∃ ∃ ∧⇒ book proposal  
 
Note that aQx P x Q x P x( :: )( ( )) ( :: )( ( ))⊃t t , where Q is one of the standard 
quantifiers ∀  and ∃  - that is, what actually exists must conceptually exist. 
Consequently, ax x x( )( )( :: :: )∀ ∀t t t  and according to our type unification 
rules a( )• =t t t . To summarize, type unification is finally defined as follows: 
 
 
 
(8)    
  
 
 
Finally, it must be noted that, in general, a type unification might fail, and 
this occurs in the absence of any relationship between the types assigned to a 
variable in the same scope. For example, assuming Artificial x( :: )naturalObj , 
i.e., that Artificial is a property ordinarily said of objects of type naturalObj, 
and assuming ( )car artifact , then the nominal compound artificial car 
would get the interpretation  
                                                 
5
 In fact, it is precisely this kind of analysis that we are performing here that will help us shed 
some light on the nature of certain ontological categories, such as {review, evaluation, 
analysis, etc.} and {proposal, suggestion, plan, etc.}. In the appendix we suggest some 
template compositional functions for [Noun Noun] compounds involving a number of patterns. 



• ≡  ∃ ∧ ∃
 ⊥
s s t
t t s
s t
s ta
Qx P x if 
Qx P x if 
Qx P x
Q x y R x y P y if R R x y
Qx P x otherwise
( :: )( ( )), ( )
( :: )( ( )), ( )
( :: ( ))( ( ))
( :: )( :: )( ( , ) ( )), ( )( ( , ))
( :: )( ( )),


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(9) an artificial car   
 λ ∃ car naturalObjP x Artificial x[( :: )( ( :: ))]⇒  
 λ ∃ •naturalObj carP x Artificial x[( :: ( ))( ( ))]⇒  
 λ ∃ ⊥P x Artificial x[( :: )( ( ))]⇒  
 
It would seem therefore that type unification fails in the interpretation of 
some phrase that does not seem to be plausible from the standpoint of 
commonsense. It should also be noted here that there are nominal compounds 
that do not confirm with our commonsense (e.g., former father) that are not 
‘caught’ with type unification, but are eventually caught at the logical level –
See (Saba, 2007) for more details on this issue.  
 
 
4 From Abstract to Actual Existence 
 
Speaking of objects that might only conceptually exist, in addition to having a 
type in some assumed ontology, leads us to extend the notion of associating 
types with quantified variables in an important way.  
Recall that our intention in associating types with quantified variables, as, 
for example, in Articulate x( :: )human , was to reflect our commonsense 
understanding of how the property Articulate is used in our everyday 
discourse, namely that Articulate is ordinarily said of objects that are of type 
human. What of a property such as Imminent, then? Undoubtedly, saying 
some object e is Imminent only makes sense in ordinary language when e is 
some event, which we have been expressing as Imminent e( :: )event . But 
there is obviously more that we can assume of e. In particular, imminent is 
said in ordinary language of some e when e is an event that has not yet 
occurred, that is, an event that exists only conceptually, which we write as 
aImminent e( :: )event . A question that arises now is this: what is the status of 
an event e that, at the same time, is imminent as well as important? Clearly, 
an important and imminent event should still be assumed to be an event that 
does not actually exist (as important as it may be). Given our type unification 
rules, important must therefore be a property that is said of an event that also 
need not actually exist, as illustrated by the following: 
 
(10) an important and imminent event   
 
a aP x Importnat x Imminent x P x[( )( ( :: ) ( :: ) ( :: ))]λ ∃ ∧ ∧entity event t⇒  
 
a aP x Importnat x Imminent x P x[( :: ( ))( ( ) ( ) ( :: ))]λ ∃ • ∧ ∧event entity t⇒  
 
aP x Importnat x Imminent x P x[( :: )( ( ) ( ) ( :: ))]λ ∃ ∧ ∧event t⇒  
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It is important to note here that one can always ‘bring down’ an object (such 
as an event) from abstract existence into actual existence, but the reverse is 
not true. Consequently, quantification over variables associated with the type 
of an abstract concept, such as event, should always initially assume abstract 
existence. To illustrate, let us first assume the following: 
 
(11) Attend x y( :: , :: )human event  
 
aCancel x y( :: , :: )human event  
 
That is, we have assumed here that it always makes sense to speak of a human 
that attended or cancelled some event, where to attend an event is to have an 
existing event; and where the object of a cancellation is an event that does 
not (anymore, if it ever did) exist6. Consider now the following: 
 
(12) john attended the seminar   
 aj e Attended j e1 1( :: )( :: )( ( :: , :: ))∃ ∃human seminar human event⇒  
 aj e Attended j e1 1( :: ( ))( :: ( ))( ( , ))∃ • ∃ •human human seminar event⇒  
 j e Attended j e1 1( :: )( :: )( ( , ))∃ ∃human seminar⇒  
 
That is, saying ‘john attended the seminar’ is saying there is a specific human 
named j, a specific seminar e (that actually exists) such that j attended e. On 
the other hand, consider now the interpretation of the sentence in (13). 
 
(13) john cancelled the seminar   
 
1 1 ajohn y Cancelled john y( :: )( :: )( ( :: , :: ))∃ ∃human seminar human event⇒  
 
1 1 ajohn y( :: ( ))( :: ( ))∃ • ∃ •human human seminar event⇒  
   Cancelled john y( ( , ))  
 
1 1 ajohn y Cancelled john y( :: )( :: )( ( , ))∃ ∃human seminar⇒  
  
What (13) states is that there is a specific human named john, and a specific 
seminar (that does not necessarily exist), a seminar that john  cancelled7. An 
interesting case now occurs when a type is ‘brought down’ from abstract 
existence into actual existence. Le us assume aPlan x y( :: , :: )human event ; that 
                                                 
6
 Tense and modal aspects can also effect the initial type assignments. For example, in ‘john will 
attend the seminar’ the initial assumption should be that the seminar (event) might not yet 
actually exist. While this does not affect the (different) argument being made here, a full 
treatment of this issue here would complicate the presentation considerably as this would 
involve discussing the interaction with syntax in much more detail. 
 
7
 As Hirst (1991) correctly notes, assuming that the reference to the seminar is intensional, i.e., 
that the reference is to ‘the idea of a seminar’ does not solve the problem since the idea of a 
seminar is not what was cancelled, but an actual event that did not actually happen!   
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is, it always makes sense to say that some human is planning (or did plan) an 
event that need not (yet) actually exist. Consider now the following,  
 
(14) john planned the trip   
 a aj e Planned x y1 1( :: )( :: )( ( :: , :: ))∃ ∃human trip human event⇒  
 a aj e Planned j e1 1( :: ( ))( :: ( ))( ( , ))∃ • ∃ •human human trip event⇒  
 aj e Planned j e1 1( :: )( :: )( ( , ))∃ ∃human trip⇒  
 
That is, saying john planned the trip is simply saying that a specific object 
that must be a human has planned a specific trip, a trip that might not have 
actually happened8. However, assuming Lengthy e( :: )event ; i.e., that Lengthy 
is a property that is ordinarily said of an (existing) event, then the 
interpretation of ‘john planned the lengthy trip’ should proceed as follows:  
 
(15) john planned the lengthy trip   
 a aj e Planned x y1 1( :: )( :: )( ( :: , :: )∃ ∃human trip human event⇒  
         Lengthy e( :: ))event∧  
 a aj e Planned j e Lengthy e1 1( :: )( :: )( ( , :: ( )) ( ))∃ ∃ •human trip event event⇒ ∧  
 aj e Planned j e Lengthy e1 1( :: )( :: ( ))( ( , ) ( ))∃ ∃ •human trip event⇒ ∧  
 j e Planned j e Lengthy e1 1( :: )( :: )( ( , ) ( ))∃ ∃human trip⇒ ∧  
 
That is, there is a specific human (named john) that has planned a specific 
trip, a trip that was Lengthy. It should be noted here that the trip in (15) 
was finally considered to be an existing event due to other information 
contained in the same sentence. In general, however, this information can be 
contained in a larger discourse. For example, in interpreting  
 
(16) John planned the trip. It was lengthy. 
 
the resolution of ‘it’ would force a retraction of the types inferred in processing 
‘John planned the trip’, as the information that follows will ‘bring down’ the 
aforementioned trip from abstract to actual existence. Such details are clearly 
beyond the scope of this paper, but readers interested in the computational 
details of such processes are referred to (van Deemter & Peters, 1996). 
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 It is the trip (event) that did not necessarily happen, not the planning (activity) for it.  
W. S. SABA 
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5 On Intensional Verbs and Dot (•) Objects 
 
Consider the following sentences and their corresponding translation into 
standard first-order logic: 
 
(17) john found a unicorn x Unicorn x Found j x( )( ( ) ( , ))∃ ⇒ ∧  
(18) john sought a unicorn x Unicorn x Sought j x( )( ( ) ( , ))∃ ⇒ ∧  
 
Note that x Elephant x( )( ( ))∃  can be inferred in both cases, although it is clear 
that ‘john sought a unicorn’ should not entail the existence of a unicorn. In 
addressing this problem, Montague (1960) suggested a solution that in effect 
treats ‘seek’ as an intensional verb that has more or less the meaning of ‘tries 
to find’, using the tools of a higher-order intensional logic. In addition to 
unnecessary complication of the logical form, however, we believe that this is, 
at best, a partial solution since the problem in our opinion is not necessarily in 
the verb seek, nor in the reference to unicorns. That is, painting, imagining, 
etc. of a unicorn (or an elephant, for that matter) should not entail the 
existence of a unicorn (nor the existence of an elephant). To illustrate further, 
let us first assume the following: 
 
(19) Paint x y( :: , :: )human painting  
(20) Find x y( :: , :: )human entity  
 
That is, we are assuming that it always makes sense to speak of a human that 
painted some painting, and of some human that found some entity. Consider 
now the interpretation in (21), where it was assumed that Large is a property 
that applies to (or makes sense of) objects that are of type physical.9 
 
(21)  john found a large elephant   
1john e( :: )( :: )∃ ∃human elephant⇒  
Found j e Large e( ( :: , :: ) ( :: ))∧human entity physical  
1john e( :: ( ))( :: ( ))∃ • ∃ •⇒ human human elephant physical  
  Found j e Large e( ( , :: ) ( ))∧entity  
1john e Found j e Large e( :: )( :: )( ( , :: )) ( ))∃ ∃ ∧⇒ human elephant entity  
1john e Found j e Large e( :: )( :: ( ))( ( , )) ( ))∃ ∃ • ∧⇒ human elephant entity
1john e Found j e Large e( :: )( :: )( ( , )) ( ))∃ ∃ ∧⇒ human elephant  
 
                                                 
9
 Of course, we are also assuming here that ( ) elephant physical entity . 
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In the final analysis, therefore, if ‘john found a large elephant’ then there is a 
specific human (named j), and some elephant e, such that e is Large and j 
found e. However, consider now the interpretation in (22). 
 
(22)  john painted a large elephant   
1john e( :: )( :: )∃ ∃⇒ human elephant  
Painted j e Large e( ( :: , :: ) ( :: ))∧human painting physical  
 
Note that what we now have is a quantified variable, e, that is supposed to be 
an object of type elephant, an object that is described by a property, where it 
is considered to be an object of type physical, and an object that is in a 
relation in which it is considered to be a painting. In this case there are two 
pairs of type unifications that must occur, namely ( )•elephant painting  and 
( )•elephant physical , where the former would result in the introduction of a 
new variable of type painting. This process, depicted graphically in figure 1 
below, would in the final analysis result in the following: 
 
(23)  john painted a large elephant   
 1 ajohn e p( :: )( :: )( :: )∃ ∃ ∃⇒ human elephant painting  
 ∧ ∧Painted j p PaintingOf p e Large e( ( , ) ( , ) ( ))  
 
Note here that the interpretation correctly states that it is a (painted) 
elephant (that need not actually exist) that is Large and not the painting 
itself. Thus, ‘john painted an elephant’ is correctly interpreted as roughly 
meaning ‘john made a painting of a large elephant’10. 
In addition to handling the so-called intensional verbs, our approach seems 
to also appropriately handle other situations that, on the surface, seem to be 
addressing a different issue. For example, consider the following: 
 
(24)  john read the book and then he burned it.  
  
In Asher and Pustejovsky (2005) it is argued that ‘book’ in this context must 
have what is called a dot type, which is a complex structure that in a sense 
carries within it the semantic types associated with various senses of ‘book’. 
For instance, it is argued that ‘book’ in (24) carries the ‘informational content’ 
sense (when it is being read) as well as the ‘physical object’ sense (when it is 
being burned). Elaborate machinery is then introduced to ‘pick out’ the right 
                                                 
10
 To get this interpretation we must assume PaintingOf x y( :: , :: )apainting physical , i.e., that 
we can always speak of a painting of some physical object that need not actually exist. 
W. S. SABA 
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sense in the right context, and all in a well-typed compositional logic. But this 
approach presupposes that one can enumerate, a priori, all possible uses of the 
word ‘book’ in ordinary language11.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. A pair of type unifications (that can happen in parallel).  
 
 
Moreover, this approach does not seem to provide a solution for the problem 
posed by example (23), since there does not seem to be an obvious reason why 
a complex dot type for ‘elephant’ should contain a representational sense, 
although it is an object that can be painted. To see how this problem is dealt 
with in our approach, consider the following:  
 
(24) Read x y( :: , :: )human content  
(25) Burn x y( :: , :: )human physical  
 
That is, we are assuming here that it always makes sense to speak of a human 
that read some content, and of a human that burned some physical object. 
Consider now the following: 
                                                 
11
 Similar presuppositions are also made in a hybrid (connectionist/symbolic) ‘sense modulation’ 
approach described by Rais-Ghasem and Corriveau (1998).  
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(26) john read a book   
 1j b ad j b( :: )( :: )( ( :: , :: ))∃ ∃⇒ human book human contentRe  
 1j b ad j b( :: ( ))( :: ( ))( ( , ))∃ • ∃ •⇒ human human book content Re  
 1j b c ContentOf b c ad j b( :: )( :: )( :: )( ( , ) ( , ))∃ ∃ ∃ ∧⇒ human book content Re  
 
Thus, if ‘john read a book’ then there is some specific human (named j), some 
object b of type book, such that that j read the content of b. On the other 
hand, consider now the following: 
 
(27) john burned a book   
 1j b Burn j b( :: )( :: )( ( :: , :: ))∃ ∃⇒ human book human physical  
 1j b Burned j b( :: ( ))( :: ( ))( ( , ))∃ • ∃ •⇒ human human book physical  
 1j b Burned j b( :: )( :: )( ( , ))∃ ∃⇒ human book  
 
That is, if ‘john burned a book’ then there is some specific human (named j), 
some object b of type book, such that that j burned b. Note, therefore, that 
when the book is being burned we are simply referring to the book as the 
physical object that it is, while reading the book implies, implicitly, that we 
are referring to an additional (abstract) object, namely the content of the 
book. The important point we wish to make here is that there is one book 
object, an object that is (ultimately) a physical object, that one can read (its 
content), sell/trade/etc (as a commodity), ..., or burn (as is, i.e., as simply 
the physical object that it is!) This means that ‘book’ can be easily used in 
different ways in the same linguistic context, as illustrated by the following:  
 
(27) john read a book and then he burned it   
 1j b ad j b( :: )( :: )( ( :: , :: )∃ ∃⇒ human book human contentRe  
  ∧ ∧ human physical            ContentOf b c Burn j b( , ) ( :: , :: ))  
 
Like the example of ‘painting a large elephant’ discussed in (23) above, where 
the painting of an elephant implied its existence in some painting and it 
being large as some physical object (that need not actually exist), in (27) we 
also have a reference to a book as a physical object (that has been burned), 
and to a book that has content (that has been read). Similar to the process 
depicted in figure 1 above, the type unifications in (27) should now result in 
the following: 
 
(28) john read a book and then he burned it   
 1j b c( :: )( :: )( :: )∃ ∃ ∃human book content⇒  
               ContentOf c b ad j c Burn j b( ( , ) ( , ) ( , ))∧ ∧Re  
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That is, there is some unique object of type human (named j), some book b, 
some content c, such that c is the content of b, and such that j read c and 
burned b. As pointed out in a previous section, it should also be noted here 
that these type unifications are often retracted in the presence of additional 
information. For example, in  
 
(29) John borrowed Das Kapital from the library. He did not agree with it.  
 
the resolution of ‘it’ would eventually result in the introduction of an 
(abstract) object of type content (which one might not agree with), as one 
does not agree (or disagree) with a physical object, an object that can indeed 
be borrowed12. 
 
 
6 All Variables were Created Equal 
 
In this section we briefly discuss to the representation of various abstract 
types (such as events, properties, activities, etc.). First, and notwithstanding 
various extensions and modifications to Davidson’s (1980) original theory, the 
advantages of treating events as individual objects that can be quantified over 
and described in various ways are, we believe, universally accepted.  
However, there does not seem to be an obvious reason an event (in 
contrast with an attribute, a property, a state, a process, a feeling, 
etc.) should receive a special ontological status, and in particular, since we 
clearly treat such categories as predicable objects in ordinary language. For 
example, consider the following, where it is assumed that Exhausting is a 
property that is ordinarily said of events, i.e., eventExhausting e( :: )  and that 
( )activity event : 
 
(30) John planned the trip. It was exhausting. 
 
In (30) ‘it’ can potentially refer to the trip (event), but it can also refer to the 
planning (activity). Thus an appropriate representation of (30) must have a 
reference to an object of type activity, and this can be done as follows: 
 
(31)  john planned the trip. It was exhausting.  
                                                 
12
 Interestingly, in addition to introducing a content object, the resolution of ‘it’ would trivially 
result in Das Kapital, since you cannot also agree or disagree with a library, but, again, with 
the content of the library’s books.  
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 1 1 1∃ ∃ ∃human activity tripj a e( :: )( :: )( :: )⇒  
           Planning a Subject a j Object a e Exhausting a( ( ) ( , ) ( , ) ( ))∧ ∧ ∧  
 1 1 1∃ ∃ ∃human activity tripj a e( :: )( :: )( :: )⇒  
           Planning a Subject a j Object a e Exhausting e( ( ) ( , ) ( , ) ( ))∧ ∧ ∧  
 
That is, there is a specific human (named j), a specific (planning) activity a, 
and a specific (event) e, such that j performed a, e was the object a, and such 
that either a or e was Exhausting. To highlight the fact that an abstract 
object (such as an event, attribute, property, state, process, etc.) should 
be treated like any other object, consider also the following: 
 
(30) a. Sheba is hungry 
 b. Running is fun 
 c. Nobility is desirable 
 d. Aging is inevitable 
 
Much like ‘sheba’ has no instances, but is in fact the name of some instance of 
type human, there also no instances of ‘nobility’, and ‘nobility’ is simply the 
name of a specific attribute; and similarly, ‘running’ is the name of some 
activity; and ‘aging’ is the name of some process, etc., which could be 
expressed as follows: 
 
(31) a. 1sheba is hungry x Noo x sheba Hungry x( :: )( ( ,‘ ’) ( ))∃ ∧ ⇒ human  
 b. 1running is fun a Noo a running Fun a( :: )( ( ,‘ ’) ( ))∃ ∧ ⇒ activity  
 c. 1nobility is desirbale a Noo a nobility Desirbale a( :: )( ( ,‘ ’) ( ))∃ ∧ ⇒ attribute  
 d. 1aging is inevitable p Noo a againg Inevitable a( :: )( ( ,‘ ’) ( ))∃ ∧ ⇒ process  
 
That is, while (31a) is a statement about some individual object, namely that 
a human named sheba is in some state, the rest of the sentences can be read 
as follows: an activity named ‘running’ is fun (31b); an attribute named 
‘nobility’ is desirable (31c); and a process named ‘aging’ is inevitable (31d). 
In this regard, the representation we are suggesting here seems to also resolve 
the debate regarding the traditional difference between the ‘is’ of identity and 
the ‘is’ of predication. To illustrate, let us again consider the following: 
 
(33) William H. Bonney is Billy the Kid   
         
1 1x y Noo x whb Noo y btk Is whb btk( :: )( :: )( ( ,‘ ’) ( ,‘ ’) ( , ))∃ ∃ ∧ ∧⇒ entity entity  
 1 1whb btk Is whb btk( :: )( :: )( ( , ))∃ ∃⇒ entity entity  
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That is, there is a specific entity named whb and a specific entity named 
btk, and whb is (identical to) btk (note that in the absence of any additional 
information all that can be said of the objects in (33) is that they are objects 
of type entity). The use of ‘is’ in the context of sentences such as (33) is 
generally considered to be the ‘is’ of identity. However, consider now the 
following: 
 
(34) William H. Bonney is a thief     
 
1whb x Thief x Is whb x( :: )( :: )( ( ) ( , ))∃ ∃ ∧⇒ entity human  
 
1whb x Thief x Is whb x( :: ( ))( )( ( ) ( , ))∃ • ∃ ∧⇒ human entity  
 
1whb x Thief x Is whb x( :: )( )( ( ) ( , ))∃ ∃ ∧⇒ human  
 
That is, ‘William H. Bonney is a theif’ is initially interpreted as follows: there 
is a unique entity, named whb, some object x of type human, such that x is a 
Thief, and such that whb is (identical to) x. However, since x is identical to ‘ 
whb’ (34) the variable can be removed, resulting in the following: 
 
(34) William H. Bonney is a thief     
 
1whb x Thief x Is whb x( :: )( )( ( ) ( , ))∃ ∃ ∧⇒ human  
 
1whb Thief whb( :: )( ( ))∃⇒ human  
 
The same result is also obtained when interpreting sentences such as ‘john is 
young’ and ‘john is running’ since these sentences essentially mean ‘john is a 
young thing’ and ‘john is a running thing’, respectively. 
 
 
7 Discussion 
 
If the main business of semantics is to explain how linguistic constructs relate 
to the world, then semantic analysis of natural language text is indirectly an 
attempt at uncovering the semiotic ontology of commonsense knowledge, and 
particularly the background knowledge that seems to be implicit in all that we 
say in our everyday discourse. While this intimate relationship between 
language and the world is generally accepted, semantics (in all its paradigms) 
has traditionally proceeded in one direction: by first stipulating an assumed 
set of ontological commitments followed by some machinery that is supposed 
to, somehow, model meanings in terms of that stipulated structure of reality.  
Given the gross mismatch between ordinary language and some of these 
presupposed ontological commitments, it is not surprising that difficulties in 
the semantic analysis of various natural language phenomena are rampant. As 
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Hobbs (1985) correctly observed some time ago, however, semantics could 
become nearly trivial if it was grounded in an ontological structure that is 
‘‘isomorphic to the way we talk about the world’’, as we also tried to 
demonstrate in this paper. However, a valid question that one might ask now 
is the following: how does one arrive at this ontological structure that 
implicitly underlies all that we say in everyday discourse? One plausible 
answer is the (seemingly circular) suggestion that the semantic analysis of 
natural language should itself be used to uncover this structure. In this regard 
we strongly agree with Dummett (1991) who states: 
 
We must not try to resolve the metaphysical questions first, and 
then construct a meaning-theory in light of the answers. We should 
investigate how our language actually functions, and how we can 
construct a workable systematic description of how it functions; the 
answers to those questions will then determine the answers to the 
metaphysical ones. 
 
What this suggests, and correctly so, in our opinion, is that in our effort to 
understand the complex and intimate relationship between ordinary language 
and everyday (commonsense) knowledge, one could, as Bateman (1995) has 
also suggested, ‘‘use language as a tool for uncovering the semiotic ontology of 
commonsense’’ since language is the only theory we have of everyday 
knowledge. To alleviate this seeming circularity in wanting this ontological 
structure that would trivialize semantics; while at the same time suggesting 
that semantic analysis of language should itself be used to uncover this 
ontological structure, we suggested in this paper performing semantic analysis 
from the ground up, assuming a minimal (almost a trivial and basic) ontology, 
building up the ontology as we go guided by the results of the semantic 
analysis. The advantages of this approach are: (i) the ontology thus constructed 
as a result of this process would not be invented, as is the case in most 
approaches to ontology (e.g., Guarino, 1995, Lenat and Guha, 1990, and Sowa, 
1995), but would instead be discovered from what is in fact implicitly assumed 
in our use of language in everyday discourse; (ii) the semantics of several 
natural language phenomena should as a result become trivial, since the 
semantic analysis was itself the source of the underlying knowledge structures 
(in a sense, one could say that the semantics would have been done before we 
even started!) 
Finally it should be noted that we would certainly have plenty of work left 
even if semantics became nearly trivial when grounded in an ontological 
structure that is isomorphic to the world and the way we talk about it, as there 
is much difficult work left to be done at the discourse/pragmatic level.  
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Appendix 
 
In section 3 we suggested the following interpretations involving the nominal 
compounds ‘a book review’ and ‘a book proposal’: 
 
(1) λ ∃ ∃ ∧book review a book review P x y ReviewOf y x P y[( :: )( :: )( ( , ) ( ))]⇒  
(2) λ ∃ ∃ ∧book proposal  aa book proposal P x y ProposalFor y x P y[( :: )( :: )( ( , ) ( ))]⇒
  
In fact it is this kind of analysis itself that seems to shed some light on the 
nature of these ontological categories. For example, we suggest that the 
following compositional function is a template for all [Noun Noun] compounds 
shown in table 1 below. 
 
(3)  a N  N substance artifact  
 λ ∃ ∃ ∧artifact substanceP x y MadeOf x y P x[( :: )( :: )( ( , ) ( ))]⇒  
 
Note, further, that the ‘MadeOf’ relation seems to be specialized for specific 
types of substance and artifact. That is, while we build a house, we erect 
a statue, knit a shirt, prepare a salad, bake a cake, etc. Thus, building, 
erecting, knitting, baking, etc. are all different (senses) ways of making, and 
this exactly why the verb ‘make’ is highly polysemous. 
 
 
   brick house  silk tie   rice pudding 
   silver spoon  cotton shirt  cheese cake 
   paper cup  leather boots  ham sandwich 
   plastic knife  wool sweater  fruit salad 
   marble statue  denim jeans   orange juice 
 
          (a)          (b)         (c) 
 
Table 1. Patterns of [Noun Noun] nominal compounds 
 
 
What would be interesting here is to be able to find out all of the generic 
compositional functions that are needed for an adequate treatment of all 
nominal compounds.  
 Finally, it should be noted that the same seems to also be true in the case 
of [Adj Noun] compounds. For example, it seems that for an object x, which 
must be of type human, Former P, where P is a property such as president, 
coach, senator, etc., has the following interpretation: 
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(4)   a Former  P  
 <λ ∃ ∃ ∧ ∧ ¬human    uP x t t t P x t P x now[( :: )( )(( ) ( , ) ( , ))]⇒  
 
where ut  is the time of utterance. That is, some object x, which must be of 
type human, is a Former P if x was (at some point in the past), and is not 
now a P. Note also that while ‘former’ combines with temporal role types 
according to (4), but not with roles such as father, doctor, etc. 
